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(Part one of a two-part series; the second
article will appear in the January 1990
Alabama Lawyer.)
This century has witnessed the rise of
an enormous federal bureaucracy. The
impact of this bureaucracy on contem-
porary life and affairs is staggering. From
the provision of social security benefits
to the distribution of highway funds to
the regulation of air and water pollution,
the presence of the federal government
is felt at virtually every conceivable level
of American society. It would be no ex-
aggeration, therefore, to say that our na-
tion is an administrative state. Moreover,
the most salient feature of that admini-
strative state lies in the sheer number,
power and diversity of federal administra-
tive agencies.
The administrative state, however, did
not suddenly blossom forth during the
20th century. Its roots are much older. As
early as 1789, Congress passed two stat-
utes which placed significant administra-
tive responsibility in the hands of federal
agencies.1 Nevertheless, the administrative
branch of the federal government grew
slowly until the pace of industrialization
began to quicken during the latter half
of the 19th century? As the need to con-
trol monopolies, protect public health
and regulate trade grew, Congress in-
creasingly turned to administrative
bodies to which it could delegate author-
ity to care for the day-to-day details of
governing. Thus, the first modern admin-
istrative agency, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, was created in 188Z Build-
ing upon that model, Congress broaden-
ed its regulatory oversight during the
early 20th century to include food and
drugs, shipping, unfair competition and
nascent industries such as radio.
The New Deal led to a tremendous ex-
pansion of regulatory power at the fed-
eral level. Regulation was extended to the
securities markets, labor relations, truck-
ing and the airlines. The 1960s and
1970s, furthermore, saw another leap in
regulatory activity, this time focusing pri-
marily on environmental protection, con-
sumer safety and social welfare. As a re-
sult of all of these developments, the role
of federal administrative agencies looms
large today in the articulation and imple-
mentation of public policy in the United
States.
Legal theory, however, was rather slow
in responding to the rise of the admini-
strative state. It was not until the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA) of 19463
that a uniform set of legal principles was
adopted for application to federal agen-
cies. The APA has become the founda-
tion on which the field of federal admin-
istrative law stands. From that basic foun-
dation, Congress and the federal courts
have continued to struggle with the ques-
tion of how to control the vast and perva-
sive authority placed in the hands of ex-
ecutive branch agencies.
This article is the first in a two-part
series on federal administrative law that
is designed as a primer for the general
practitioner. Part I in this series will focus
upon the exercise of rulemaking and ad-
judicatory power by federal agencies and
the standards used by the federal judici-
ary in reviewing administrative decision-
making. Part II, in turn, will discuss the
threshold problems involved in obtain-
ing judicial review of agency action.
I. The exercise of administrative
power
A. The distinction between rulemak-
ing and adjudication
The conventional way to introduce the
methods by which agencies act is to dis-
tinguish administrative rulemaking from
adjudication. Rulemaking is often de-
scribed as quasi-legislative action since
it resembles the manner in which a leg-
islature enacts a statute. Rulemakings are
aimed at developing policy standards
and norms for future application. The
procedures for rulemaking therefore are
designed to solicit general facts and a
broad range of opinion. Administrative
adjudication, on the other hand, is com-
monly termed quasi-judicial due to its af-
finity for judicial process. Adjudications
often involve a determination of whether
a party acted in accordance with an exist-
ing legal norm and, therefore, are typical-
ly retrospective in nature and accusatory
in flavor.
1. Under the Constitution
Two early Supreme Court decisions in-
dicate, at least in a general way, when an
agency may use quasi-legislative pro-
cedures or must use quasi-adjudicative
procedures. In Londoner v. Denver a city
agency ordered the paving of a street and
assessed the cost to the neighboring
landowners. Since some of the lots were
irregular in shape, the agency was not
able to consistently apply a simple rule
relating cost to front-footage. The agency,
however, relied upon a quasi-legislative
model to apportion the costs and thus
gave the landowners notice and an op-
portunity to comment only in writing.
Their request for an oral hearing was
denied s Without much analysis, the
Court held that the refusal to grant an
oral hearing constituted a violation of
due process. Rather than relying upon
quasi-legislative procedures, the situation
demanded quasi-adjudicative proce-
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dures that would afford the landowners
an opportunity for oral argument and the
presentation of evidence.
On the other hand, Bi-Metallic Invest-
ment Co. v. State Board of Equalization7
involved an order by a state agency that
increased the value of all taxable proper-
ty in Denver by 40 percent. Although the
agency gave the taxpayers no opportunity
to be heard and the order clearly
deprived the taxpayers of property
through increased taxation, the Court
found no constitutional infirmity. Justice
Holmes distinguished Londoner by say-
ing that in that instance a relatively small
group of persons was involved, who were
affected in individually unique ways.
The agency, therefore, was actually en-
gaged in adjudicatory action judging dif-
ferent persons on the basis of divergent
and disputed facts. By contrast, Bi-
Metallic concerned a general rule that
applied to all landowners in the same
way. Thus, the agency was making a
policy-oriented decision which was more
legislative in character.
2. Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act
Building upon this constitutional dis-
tinction, administrative action under the
Administrative Procedure Act 9 is charac-
terized as either rulemaking or adjudica-
tion. The object of rulemaking, of course,
is the establishment of standards for
future application rather than the evalua-
tion of a particular person's past conduct
or eligibility for a license or permit. Con-
sequently, the issues in a rulemaking do
not generally relate to specific eviden-
tiary facts, but focus upon policy-type
conclusions which are drawn from a
wide variety of sources. Adjudication, on
the other hand, usually involves a factual-
ly-oriented determination as to whether
a party's past conduct was lawful or
whether a party is entitled to a permit or
license.
B. Rulemaking under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act
1. Informal rulemaking
Informal rulemaking is the most com-
mon way in which regulations are pro-
mulgated at the federal level. Informal
rulemaking, also known as notice-and-
comment rulemaking, requires an
agency to publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register setting
forth, inter alia, the terms or substance
of the proposal.0 Following this notice,
the agency must "give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule-
making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation' An
agency is under no obligation to hold
oral hearings with regard to an informal
rulemaking, although, in its discretion,
an agency may decide to do so.
After considering the relevant material
presented by the public, the agency must
publish both the final rule and "a con-
cise general statement" of the rule's basis
and purpose which is generally referred
to as a preamble2 In many instances, the
final rule is then subject to judicial
review.
Most preambles, in recent years, have
been much more detailed than the words
"concise general statement" would sug-
gest. This has occurred because the
federal courts during the 1970s began to
demand a reasoned elaboration of an
agency's thinking to aid the judiciary in
reviewing complicated rulemakings'
Furthermore, the preamble also must re-
spond to well-supported, material argu-
ments made by the public during the
comment period14 Thus, the courts can
determine whether an agency is truly
considering the comments made by the
public.
Informal rules promulgated pursuant to
notice-and-comment procedures are sub-
stantive law, binding on agencies, courts
and private parties05 However, an agency
may adopt interpretive rules, procedural
rules and general statements of policy
without satisfying the requirements of
notice-and-comment rulemakingj6 Such
rules, though, do not have the force of
law and are not binding
7
2. Formal rulemaking
Under the APA, informal rulemaking
procedures apply to all substantive rules
unless a rule is "required by statute to be
made on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing."" ' An agency, there-
fore, must use formal rulemaking pro-
cedures when its enabling statute so
requires.
Formal rulemaking begins the same
way as informal rulemaking-with public
notice of the proposed rulej 9 After
notice, however, the requirement for
public comment is replaced with pro-
cedures which are nearly identical to
those called for in a formal adjudica-
tion o Thus, the agency, must hold an
evidentiary hearing where the parties
have the right to present oral and
documentary evidence and cross-
examine witnesses?' Unlike most formal
adjudications, however, the agency may
decide to receive all or part of the evi-
dence in written form as long as a party
would not be prejudiced.22 At the con-
clusion of the hearing, the agency must
base its findings and conclusions solely
upon the evidentiary record produced
during the course of the proceeding?
3
Formal rulemaking generally involves
broad, complicated questions of policy
which will affect substantial numbers of
people. Formal trial-type procedures,
however, are better designed to resolve
factual disputes between a few parties
rather than to promulgate rules. Hence,
formal rulemakings typically grind on
very slowly with dozens of parties pre-
senting witnesses and dozens of parties
conducting cross-examination. The re-
quirement of formal rulemaking, thus,
often will result in a procedural morass
and, eventually, the abandonment or re-
laxation of a regulatory program.
Perhaps as a reaction to these difficul-
ties, the presumption in rulemaking cases
favors the use of informal procedures.
Formal rulemaking, therefore, is triggered
solely by a statutory provision that (1)
refers to a hearing and (2) recites the
words "on the record" or some equiva-
lent that clearly reveal the intent of Con-
gress to require formal procedures?4
C. Adjudication under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act
1. Formal adjudication
The APA requires the use of formal ad-
judication only in cases of an "adjudica-
tion required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing'" 25 Affected persons must
be given notice of the hearing, which in-
cludes: (1) the time, place and nature of
the hearing, (2) the legal authority for the
hearing, and (3) the matters of law and
fact asserted?6 Following notice, the op-
posing parties are given a chance to re-




Formal adjudications are presided over
by the agency, one or more members of
the body that comprises the agency, or
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)? 8 In
most cases, however, the presiding officer
is an ALJ. Although ALJs are agency em-
ployees, they possess a great deal of in-
dependence. Their compensation is fix-
ed, not by the agency, but by the Office
of Personnel Management, independent
of agency recommendations" Further-
more, ALJs can be disciplined only for
"good cause" by the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board.30 ALJs are assigned to
cases in rotation and may not perform
duties which are incompatible with their
judicial responsibilities1 Finally, ALJs
may not be supervised by an agency of-
ficial who has an investigative or prose-
cutorial role2
A party to a formal adjudication may
appear in person or through counsel
3
and may present oral or documentary
evidence 4 A party may also cross-
examine opposing witnesses to the ex-
tent required "for a full and fair dis-
closure of the facts.'3" ALJs are not re-
quired, in most instances, to adhere to
the same rules of evidence which apply
in federal courts. The APA, in fact, directs
an ALJ to receive "[any oral or documen-
tary evidence" as long as it is not "irrele-
vant, immaterial or unduly repetitious'
36
Following the evidentiary hearing, the
ALJ generally issues an initial decision,
which contains the "findings and conclu-
sions, and the reasons or basis therefor,
on all the material issues of fact, law or
discretion presented on the record'
37
The initial decision becomes the final
decision of the agency unless an appeal
is taken to the agency.?8 On appeal, the
agency has the power to undertake de
novo review of the ALJ's initial decision?9
2. Informal adjudication
Informal adjudication (or informal ac-
tion) describes all agency decisions not
encompassed by rulemaking or formal
adjudication. It often includes the pro-
cessing of applications and claims, tests
and inspections, advice, and similar rou-
tine decisions. In fact, the vast bulk of
federal decisionmaking can be termed
informal adjudication. Due to the wide
variety of informal administrative deci-
sions, the APA establishes no procedural
framework for informal adjudication. The
procedures governing informal adjudica-
tion, therefore, will be those, if any, estab-
lished by statute or by the agency, re-
quired by the Constitution or imposed by
the judiciary.
D. Agency discretion in choosing a
procedural mode
Many agencies often confront a choice
between adopting a substantive rule
through informal rulemaking or an-
nouncing a general principle of law
through formal adjudication. Such a
choice only will arise, of course, when
an agency is vested with the statutory
authority to both promulgate substantive
rules and adjudicate cases dealing with
the same subject matter.
While the federal courts have ex-
pressed a strong preference for the rule-
making model when it comes to the
creation of law, they recognize that not
every new principle of law can be cast
in the form of a regulation. Many prob-
lems, for example, cannot be anticipated
until presented in the context of a real
F a t
The programs ask multiple-choice and
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1 d
case. Or an agency may not have had
enough experience with a problem to
establish a rigid rule prior to the adjudi-
cation of a concrete controversy. Conse-
quently, the federal courts have not im-
posed any inflexible requirement that
agencies establish general rules of law
solely through rulemaking. 0 In short,
agencies have discretion to announce a
new principle by means of rulemaking
or to announce and apply a new princi-
ple via adjudication.Y
II. Judicial review of administrative
decisions
A. Questions of law and policy
The APA clearly states that a reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions
of law?2 Thus, if an agency's statutory in-
terpretation is inconsistent with the
language of a statute, as viewed in light
of its legislative history and its purposes,
a court must give effect to the intent of
Congress?3 However, if an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute it administers does
other ancillary documents.
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not contradict the statute's language or
frustrate its purpose, the role of a review-
ing court is limited. The agency's con-
struction will be upheld if it is sufficiently
reasonable, even if it is not the most rea-
sonable interpretation in the eyes of the
court 4 The amount of deference shown
to an agency's interpretation increases in
cases where an agency interpretation
was made contemporaneously with the
statute's passage, has been consistently
adhered to, or involves questions of
scientific or technical expertise.5
The Supreme Court recently articu-
lated one rationale for this principle of
deference. In cases where a statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to a par-
ticular issue, the Court believes that Con-
gress has delegated to the administrative
agency, rather than the courts, the task
of filling the gap. Thus, the agency must
make a policy choice, and the federal
courts have a duty to respect the legiti-
mate and reasonable policy choices
made by an agency. 6
B. Questions of fact and the exercise
of discretion
1. De novo review
De novo review of agency findings of
fact to determine whether they are "un-
warranted" is authorized by 5 U.S.C.
§706(2)(F) in two limited situations. Such
independent judicial factfinding is called
for (1) when an action is adjudicatory and
the agency's procedures for factfinding
are inadequate, or (2) when new issues




Reviewing courts will examine an
agency's factual findings under the sub-
stantial evidence test whenever the
agency acted pursuant to sections 556
and 557 of the APA.8 It is, therefore, ap-
plied to the review of formal rulemakings
and formal adjudications 9
The Supreme Court has defined sub-
stantial evidence as "more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion:'5° The
Court later amplified this definition by
holding that a reviewing court may deter-
mine whether evidence is substantial
only after examining "whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight."'
A court, therefore, must consider the
record as a whole, taking into account
not only the evidence which supports
the agency's finding, but any evidence
that conflicts with it.
Consistent with the liberal rules of
evidence in agency proceedings, hearsay
evidence is deemed sufficient to consti-
tute substantial evidence as long as the
hearsay is of a type relied upon by rea-
sonably prudent persons in conducting
their own affairss 2
3. The arbitrary/capricious test
In situations where an agency took ac-
tion through informal rulemaking or in-
formal adjudication, the APA requires a
reviewing court to decide whether the
agency's factual decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion5 3
This standard of review is, theoretically
at least, the most deferential form of
review. According to the Supreme Court,
a court must consider whether the deci-
sion was based on a:
"consideration of the relevant fac-
tors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment .... Al-
though this inquiry into the facts is
to be searching and careful, the ul-
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timate standard of review is a nar-
row one. The court is not em-
powered to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency ..... s4
In applying this standard, the "focal
point for judicial review" is the admini-
strative record that was created at the
agency level 5 Therefore, the validity of
the agency's determination rests solely
on the administrative record which is
already in existence 6
C. Hard look review and informal
rulemaking in an era of high
technology
During the 1970s, informal notice-and-
comment rulemaking evolved into a
highly visible and significant force in the
administrative process. A host of new
statutes, many of which involved environ-
mental or consumer protection, were
enacted that predicated their regulatory
schemes upon a plethora of standards to
be established through informal rulemak-
ing procedures. Those rulemakings are
often quite complicated, scientifically
and technically, and likely involve signif-
icant economic and social impacts. Re-
acting to this development, the federal
courts have fashioned a rigorous form of
review that is commonly referred to as
a hard look.57
The origins of this hard look review
may be traced to Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,58 which
called for judicial review under the ar-
bitrary and capricious test that would be
"narrow" and yet "searching."5 9 While
elaborating upon the nature of this test,
the D.C. circuit has stated that, although
the standard is "highly deferential" to
agency findings, it does not require a
court to "rubberstamp the agency deci-
sion "60 Thus, especially in highly tech-
nical cases, a reviewing court must probe
deeply into the administrative record to
discern whether the agency has exer-
cised its discretion in reasonable fashion.
This heightened type of scrutiny is not
intended to allow the court to supplant
the agency's technical expertise, but
merely to allow the court to understand
whether the agency has based its deci-
sion upon a consideration of the relevant
factorsl
In order to perform this task, the courts
have required agencies to articulate the









the preamble) in far more detail than had
been required before 1970.62 The courts
basically want an agency to explain the
reasons why it chose one course of
action over another, the facts that choice
is based upon, and the considerations
the agency found persuasive. 3 In addi-
tion, the courts have held that agencies
possess an obligation to respond to sig-
nificant comments made during the
public comment period.
6 4
Potential challengers to agency infor-
mal rulemaking have a concomitant ob-
ligation in the courts' view. They must
realize that the success of open and par-
ticipatory procedures depends upon
them as well as upon the agencies. Con-
sequently, the courts have required chal-
lengers to make substantial and good
faith use of the opportunities to com-
ment. Therefore, technical, factual or
policy concerns should be raised during
the comment period. If they are not
raised at that time, reviewing courts will
give the complaining party rather limited
latitude to raise those issues during the
course of subsequent judicial review.65
The hard look doctrine has also ap-
peared in the context of deregulation. In
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,66 the Supreme Court held that the
Department of Transportation had not
supplied a sufficiently reasoned analysis
for rescinding a rule which required the
installation of passive restraint systems in
all automobiles. In the decision, the
Court summarized the hard look doc-
trine in the following fashion:
"The scope of review under the 'ar-
bitrary and capricious' standard is
narrow and a court is not to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Nevertheless, the agency
must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation
for its action including a 'rational
connection between the facts
found and the choice made'...
Normally, an agency rule would be
arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the prob-
lem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise "'
67
Thus, the judiciary may be seen not only
as a mechanism which guards against the
unauthorized expansion of regulatory
power, but also as a bulwark against the
unjustified dilution or elimination-of reg-
ulatory standards.
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